



KEY THEME¹

Article 10

Artistic expression

(Last updated: 28/02/2026)

Introduction

The Court has not yet defined “art” or “artistic expression,” nor does it systematically employ a test to determine whether a form of expression may be defined as “art” or “artistic.” Article 10 does not directly specify that artistic freedom comes within its ambit, but, as the Court has acknowledged, the text of Article 10 does not distinguish between various forms of expression (*Müller and Others v. Switzerland*, 1988, § 27).

Whilst leaving open the question of whether artistic expression enjoys comparatively more protection under Article 10 than other forms of expression (*N. v. Switzerland* (Commission decision), 1983), the Court has pointed out that artistic freedom is a “value in itself,” and it “attracts a high level of protection under the Convention” (*Jelševar and Others v. Slovenia* (dec.), 2014, § 33). This protection “affords the opportunity to take part in the public exchange of cultural, political and social information and ideas of all kinds” (*Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France* [GC], 2007, § 47).

Principles drawn from the case-law

- Opinions expressed through the media of artistic work are protected by Article 10 (*Murat Vural v. Turkey*, 2014, § 45).
- States have an obligation not to encroach unduly on an author’s freedom of expression (*Mariya Alekhina and Others v. Russia*, 2018, § 203; see also *Müller and Others v. Switzerland*, 1988, §§ 27 and 33).
- Artistic freedom extends to forms of expression that offend, shock or disturb the State or any section of the population, as is demanded by the pluralism and tolerance inherent in a democratic society (*Vereinigung Bildender Künstler and Others v. Austria*, 2007, § 26).
- Guarantees of artistic freedom secured by Article 10 are not only applicable to the artist who paints and exhibits his or her work, but also to those giving the artist the opportunity to show the work in a public exhibition (*Müller and Others v. Switzerland*, 1988, § 27).
- Whoever exercises his or her freedom of expression also undertakes certain duties and responsibilities consistent with Article 10 (*Sinkova v. Ukraine*, 2018, § 104; see also *Müller and Others v. Switzerland*, 1988, § 34; *Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France* [GC], 2007, § 51).

¹ Prepared by the Registry. It does not bind the Court.

Relevant criteria

Scope of Artistic Freedom under Article 10:

Article 10 protects “not only the substance of the ideas and information expressed but also the form in which they are conveyed” (*Karataş v. Turkey* [GC], 1999, § 49). Accordingly, the Court has consistently found that the Convention protects the freedom of artistic expression because it protects the freedom to receive and impart information and ideas (*Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France* [GC], 2007, § 47; *Müller and Others v. Switzerland*, 1988, § 27; *Alexandru Pătraşcu v. Romania*, 2025, § 94; see also *Izzettin Dogan and Others v. Turkey* [GC], 2016, § 109, where the Court found that the concept of pluralism under Article 9 includes “artistic ... ideas and concepts”).

Rather than provide an abstract definition for “artistic expression”, the Court usually decides on a case-by-case basis whether a form of expression can be described as “artistic.” The Convention institutions recognised different forms of expression as “artistic expression”:

- **traditional visual art forms**, such as paintings (*Vereinigung Bildender Künstler and Others v. Austria*, 2007, § 33), sculptures (*S. and G. v. the United Kingdom* (Commission decision), 1991), and cartoons (*Leroy v. France*, 2008, § 44);
- **traditional literary art forms**, such as plays (*Kar and Others v. Turkey*, 2007, § 45; *Ulusoy and Others v. Turkey*, 2007, § 42), poems (*Karataş v. Turkey* [GC], 1999, § 49), and novels (*Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France* [GC], 2007, § 47 and *Akdaş v. Turkey*, 2010, § 25);
- **performance art**, such as, for instance, protests at a war memorial (*Sinkova v. Ukraine*, 2018, § 107), performing a political song in a cathedral (*Mariya Alekhina and Others v. Russia*, 2018, § 206), and hanging dirty laundry outside a government building (*Tatár and Fáber v. Hungary*, 2012, § 41).

Satire and Artistic Freedom

Satire is a form of artistic expression and social commentary that uses exaggeration and distortion of reality to provoke and agitate. Thus, the Court examines any limitation on satire “with particular care” (*Vereinigung Bildender Künstler and Others v. Austria*, 2007, § 33), considering the following principles:

- Satire can take many forms. For example, the Court recognised a humorous advertisement campaign, that used the name of notorious personalities and dealt with events of public interest, as a form of satire—and thus, artistic expression (*Bohlen v. Germany*, 2015, § 50; *Ernst August von Hannover v. Germany*, 2015, § 49).
- The Court considers the “nature of a text and the irony underlying it” when analysing satire. The guarantee of artistic freedom under Article 10 extends to “a degree of exaggeration or even provocation,” or, in other words, “a degree of immoderation” (*Ziemiński v. Poland (no. 2)*, 2016, § 44; *Grebneva and Alisimchik v. Russia*, 2016, § 59).
 - In a case concerning the refusal to prosecute a comedian for referring to a homosexual celebrity as “female,” the Court stated that parody retains a “particularly wide margin of appreciation” under Article 10 (*Sousa Goucha v. Portugal*, 2016, § 50).
 - In a case concerning a pamphlet that accused politicians of theft, the Court found that the ironic nature of the accusation rendered the statement a value judgment, not a statement of fact (*Sokołowski v. Poland*, 2005, § 46).
- The Court considers how the “average reader,” not the target of the joke, would understand a particular form of satire (*Nikowitz and Verlagsgruppe News GmbH v. Austria*, 2007, §§ 24-25; see also *Sousa Goucha v. Portugal*, 2016, § 55, which deals with the

“reasonable spectator” of a comedy show). For example, the fact that an alleged defamation occurred at a carnival was conclusive in finding that the puppet show in question was satirical (*Alves da Silva v. Portugal*, 2009, § 28).

- At the same time, the Court recognises a certain limit to satire’s tendency to provoke. For instance, it held that satire cannot go so far as to glorify terrorism (*Leroy v. France*, 2008, §§ 36-48; *Z.B. v. France*, 2021, §§ 56-57, both regarding the September 11 attacks). Nor can satire be used to demonstrate blatant hatred (*M’Bala M’Bala v. France*, 2015, § 44, regarding an anti-Semitic sketch).

Fiction and Artistic Freedom

By its very nature, fiction often entails a degree of exaggeration (*Jelševar and Others v. Slovenia* (dec.), 2014, § 34). The Court considers that most readers recognise that fiction does not portray real people or events (*ibid.*, § 38). Thus, the Court examines limitations on fiction considering the following principles.

- As in satire cases, it considers how the “average reader” would understand a fictional text (*Nikowitz and Verlagsgruppe News GmbH v. Austria*, 2007, §§ 24-25).
- Because fictional works may involve “a degree of exaggeration” or “colourful and expressive imagery,” the Court recognises that Article 10 protects the style—not just the substance—of a fictional work (*Jelševar and Others v. Slovenia* (dec.), 2014, § 34).
 - For instance, it found that an anthology of poetry calling for “self-sacrifice” for a nationalist movement was protected by Article 10 because the poems were emotional expressions of anger, fear, and joy (*Karataş v. Turkey* [GC], 1999, §§ 45-52).
 - On another occasion, the Court found that even “very hostile” passages in a novel were protected by Article 10 because their artistic nature evinced that they were “an expression of deep distress” (*Alinak v. Turkey*, 2005, § 45).
- When a work “juxtapos[es]...reality and fiction,” the Court weighs whether the value judgments about the real elements of a fictional work are supported by factual evidence (*Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France* [GC], 2007, § 19, 55).
- The Court often weighs the limited reach of fictional works against the dangers that they allegedly pose under Article 10 § 2. (*Alinak v. Turkey*, 2005, § 45; *Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France* [GC], 2007, § 47).
- The Court may consider a fictional work’s importance in the public discourse. Thus, it found that the State’s margin of appreciation was limited in a case where a novel that was part of the European literary heritage was censored in Turkish because this censorship constituted a functional denial of access to this literary work (*Akdaş v. Turkey*, 2010, §§ 28-30).

Justified Limitations on Artistic Freedom:

States may interfere with artistic freedom on the grounds permitted by Article 10 § 2. The right to artistic freedom secured under Article 10 comes with the “duties and responsibilities” elucidated in its second paragraph (*Müller and Others v. Switzerland*, 1988, § 34). The following is a list of examples of the limitations on artistic freedom that the Court has recognised pursuant to Article 10 § 2 of the Convention.

Limitations Based on National Security and Public Safety

- The concepts of “national security” and “public safety” must be applied with restraint and interpreted restrictively (*Zhdanov and Others v. Russia*, 2019, § 156). This principle often plays a role in the Court’s analysis of whether a prohibition is “necessary in a democratic society”.

- For instance, the Court accepted that the Government's prohibition on a book of Kurdish poetry that glorified armed rebellion and martyrdom may have pursued the legitimate aim of protecting territorial integrity. However, it considered that, although the poems' aggressive tone may be offensive, they could not be considered to constitute incitement to violence given their artistic nature and limited audience (*Karataş v. Turkey* [GC], 1999, § 44).
- In another case, the Court rejected as inadmissible a complaint by a Russian national whose music supported the annexation of Crimea against a State which averred that allowing him entrance into the country would endanger its national security by providing an outlet to Russian propaganda (*Kirkorov v. Lithuania* (dec.), 2024).
- The "prevention of disorder" rationale may include protecting a country's cultural heritage. For instance, the Court rejected an applicant's allegation that a restriction on placing works of art within the visibility of protected historic buildings violated Article 10 as manifestly ill-founded. In doing so, the Court considered that States have a general interest in protecting their cultural heritage, which justified planning regulations like the one at issue (*Ehrmann and SCI VHI v. France*, 2011).

Limitations Based on Morality

- The Court has stated that some pornographic material may be so "seriously obscene" that it is not "of any artistic merit." In this case, the Court was reviewing pornographic material that included "coprophilia [and] coprophagia" (*Perrin v. the United Kingdom* (dec.), 2005).
- Because States are in a better position to assess the necessity of a restriction on artistic freedom for the protection of morals, the Court tends to provide States with a substantial margin of appreciation in doing so (*Wingrove v. the United Kingdom*, 1996, § 58).
 - For instance, it has found that a restriction on sexually obscene paintings did not violate Article 10 because States ultimately may confiscate "items whose use has been lawfully adjudged illicit and dangerous to the general interest" (*Müller and Others v. Switzerland*, 1988, § 42).
 - However, the Court has also found that a broad seizure preventing access to a publication with an article on pornography may be disproportionate, especially if age restrictions or warning labels could have sufficed. Even though the pornographic content, which contained some LGBT perspectives, might be sensitive to some audiences, this fact could not justify a complete ban (*Kaos GL v. Turkey*, 2016, §§ 60-61).
- The Court also provides a wide margin of appreciation to a State when its justification is the protection of minors.
 - For instance, the Court has found that a State's aim to protect minors' rights justified restrictions on a film that contained multiple pornographic scenes. Despite the film's temporary unavailability in cinemas, these restrictions adequately balanced the need to protect minors while not unduly curtailing artistic expression (*V.D. and G.G. v. France* (dec.), 2006).
 - The Court has also found that a State's aim to protect minors from pornography did not justify the refusal of a film reproduction licence to a company that distributed pornographic films, given that age restrictions can be placed on pornographic materials (*Pryanishnikov v. Russia*, 2019, § 55 and 61).
 - However, the Court found that a State's aim to protect minors from information concerning same-sex relationships was not a legitimate aim under Article 10 § 2. Thus, the State had no cognisable justification for restricting a book of fairy tales that depicted a same-sex couple (*Macatè v. Lithuania* [GC], 2023, § 217).

Limitations Based on Protection of Others' Rights

- States may limit artistic freedom to protect one's reputation under the Article 8 **right to private life**. For instance, the Court found that restrictions on a novel which made defamatory statements could be justified, even though the novel had a limited reach (*Almeida Leitão Bento Fernandes v. Portugal*, 2015, § 45).
- States may also limit artistic freedom to protect **religious pluralism** secured under Article 9.
 - Since what is likely to cause substantial offence to persons of a particular religious persuasion will vary significantly from time to time and from place to place, especially in an era characterised by an ever growing array of faiths and denominations, States maintain a wide margin of appreciation in its decision to balance its obligations under Articles 9 and 10 (*Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria*, 1994, § 50; *Wingrove v. the United Kingdom*, 1996, § 58).
 - For instance, a State may restrict artistic depictions that present a religious subject in a "contemptuous, reviling, insulting, scurrilous or ludicrous tone, style and spirit" if it may "outrage those who have an understanding of, sympathy towards and support for a religion's story and ethic" (*Wingrove v. the United Kingdom*, 1996, § 48).
 - In another case, the Court concluded that the right of citizens not to be insulted in their religious feelings could be a legitimate aim of the State in restricting artistic freedom. Here, the play in question depicted the Christian God as a senile man in a relationship with the Devil and Jesus Christ as mentally defective (*Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria*, 1994, § 22).
 - However, this is not decisive: the Court has held that religious believers must "must tolerate and accept the denial by others of their religious beliefs and even the propagation by others of doctrines hostile to their faith" (*Sekmadienis Ltd. v. Lithuania*, 2018, § 81).

Necessity of a State's Limitations of Artistic Freedom

As other areas of its Article 10 jurisprudence, the Court examines whether the impugned limitation on artistic freedom would be "necessary in a democratic society." In doing so, it emphasises the context of the artistic expression at issue. If an artistic work relates to a debate on a matter of general concern or constitutes political and militant expression, the Court typically accords a high level of protection to it (see *Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France* [GC], 2007, § 46; *Mariya Alekhina and Others v. Russia*, 2018, § 260). Moreover, the limits of permissible criticism are wider with regard to the government than in relation to a private citizen or even a politician (*Karataş v. Turkey* [GC], 1999, § 50).

- The Court has considered whether the imposition of an administrative sanction on mixed artistic-political expression would have an undesirable **chilling effect** on public speech. Under this reasoning, the Court found that a fine for attaching dirty clothing to the fence around a Parliament building to represent "the nation's dirty laundry" violated Article 10 (*Tatár and Fáber v. Hungary*, 2012, § 41). In another case, the Court found that a website portraying coprophilic pornography did not contribute to any political debate, and thus, restrictions on the website could not have produced a chilling effect (*Perrin v. the United Kingdom* (dec.), 2005).
- The Court has held that **time / place** of the expression may be relevant. For instance, the Court acknowledged that hosting an artistic performance in a publicly accessible property might necessitate adhering to specific conduct regulations, depending on the nature and purpose of the venue (*Mariya Alekhina and Others v. Russia*, 2018, § 213).

- Linked to the above, the Court has considered whether there was an **alternative venue** for the relevant artistic expression. For instance, the Court rejected an applicant's Article 10 claim because she had other suitable opportunities to express her views without insulting the memory of soldiers who perished and the feelings of veterans through her artistic performance (*Sinkova v. Ukraine*, 2018, § 110).
- The Court also takes the **possible impact** of the applicant's artistic expression into account (*Müller and Others v. Switzerland*, 1988, § 36).
 - The artistic expression in question need not **actually** have led to **harmful consequences**; the Court is more concerned with the possibility that it might have (see *Karataş v. Turkey* [GC], 1999, § 52; *Mariya Alekhina and Others v. Russia*, 2018, § 220). In the latter case, which concerned a punk band's performance in a cathedral, the Court criticised the domestic courts' failure to examine whether the applicants' actions could have been interpreted as a call for violence or as a justification of violence, hatred or intolerance, or whether the actions in question could have led to harmful consequences (*Mariya Alekhina and Others v. Russia*, 2018, § 226). On the other hand, even if a publication has a limited impact, an interference can be justified when the publication provokes reactions that could fuel violence and the government can demonstrate its plausible impact on public order in a certain region (*Leroy v. France*, 2008, § 45; *Z.B. v. France*, 2021, §§ 62-63).
 - In this analysis, the Court may consider if the artistic expression is **public and accessible**.
 - For instance, the Court found that a State may impose limits on an exhibition that contained sexual imagery because it was open to the public without any admission charge or age limits (*Müller and Others v. Switzerland*, 1988, § 36).
 - In an early case, the Court found that advertising the screening of a film subject to an age limit was sufficiently "public" to cause offence because wide advertisement created public knowledge of the subject-matter and the basic contents of a film, whose nature may be offensive (*Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria*, 1994, § 54). In more recent cases, the Court observed, however, that introducing a ban on selling certain materials to audience below a certain age, or an obligation to sell those with a special cover with a warning addressed to persons under a certain age, or an obligation to sell it via a subscription only would be sufficient for protection of minors, whereas a total ban on distribution of such materials to *any* audience would not be justified (*Kaos GL v. Turkey*, 2016, §§ 60-61; *Pryanishnikov v. Russia*, 2019, § 61).
 - The Court has recognised that video works are, by their very nature, accessible when they are public—even if its distribution is limited and less likely to attract publicity. Thus, the Court found that a complete ban on the distribution of a sexually blasphemous film not made for mass consumption was justified, even if the film was sold with a warning as to the film's content (*Wingrove v. the United Kingdom*, 1996, § 63).
 - In this analysis, the Court may also consider the breadth of the artistic expression's **actual and potential dissemination**.
 - The Court has often given some weight to the fact that novels are a form of artistic expression that appeal to a relatively narrow public compared to, for example, the mass media or the written press (*Alinak v. Turkey*, 2005, § 41; *Almeida Leitão Bento Fernandes v. Portugal*, 2015, § 48).
 - For instance, it found that the limited potential impact of a play, which was staged on just eight occasions, was relevant in addressing the proportionality of a prison sentence for staging the work (*Kar and Others v. Turkey*, 2007, § 46).

- In another case, the Court took into account that poetry, the medium used by the applicant, appealed to only a minority of readers (*Karataş v. Turkey* [GC], 1999, § 49).
- The Court also concluded that a penal sanction – for a political leaflet that criticised local councillors for appointing themselves to paid election committee roles, which had addressed a public interest without gratuitous attacks – was not warranted given, in particular, the minor impact of the leaflet (*Sokołowski v. Poland*, 2005, § 49).
- Even artistic works with limited impact, however, may be subject to some restriction (see *Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France* [GC], 2007, § 47, which discusses the limited impact criterion in the context of the potential damage that literary creations are capable of causing to a person’s reputation). Furthermore, the Court does not always take into account the limited impact of a novel (see *i.A. v. Turkey*, 2005, where the Court did not consider that the novel at issue had a limited impact due to its print run of 2,000 copies).

Noteworthy examples

- *Karataş v. Turkey* [GC], 1999 – a criminal conviction for publishing an anthology of poems that were aggressive towards the State authorities (violation of Article 10);
- *Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France* [GC], 2007 – a criminal conviction for defamation of an extreme right-wing party and its president (no violation of Article 10);
- *Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain* [GC], 2011 – a dismissal of a worker for drawing a caricature that insulted colleagues (no violation of Article 10 read in the light of Article 11).
- *Macatė v. Lithuania* [GC], 2023 – censorship of a fairy tale book for depictions of same-sex relationships (violation of Article 10)
- *Müller and Others v. Switzerland*, 1988 – fine on artists for the exhibition of obscene paintings (no violation of Article 10);
- *Vereinigung Bildender Künstler and Others v. Austria*, 2007 – censorship of a sexual painting depicting politician (violation of Article 10);
- *Tatár and Fáber v. Hungary*, 2012 – fine for attaching dirty clothing to the fence around the Parliament building to represent “the nation’s dirty laundry” (violation of Article 10);
- *Sinkova v. Ukraine*, 2018 – prison sentence for frying eggs over the flame of a memorial in protest of the poor living standards of veterans (no violation of Article 10);
- *Mariya Alekhina and Others v. Russia*, 2018 – prison sentence for an attempted performance of critical song from altar of cathedral as a response to ongoing political process (violation of Article 10);
- *Bouton v. France*, 2022 – suspended prison sentence and civil damages for a woman’s solo demonstration at the altar of a Catholic church, during which she appeared holding pieces of beef liver and with slogans painted on her bare chest, in protest of the church’s stance on abortion (violation of Article 10).

Further references

Case-law guides:

- [Guide on Article 10 – Freedom of expression](#)

Other key themes:

- Expressive conduct

United Nations:

- Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Articles 19 and 27(1)
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Articles 15 and 19
- International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 15(3)
- Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions
- UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity
- Fribourg Declaration on Cultural Rights (la Déclaration de Fribourg), 2007
- UNESCO Recommendation concerning the Status of the Artist, Section III.3
- Report of the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights: the right to freedom of artistic expression and creativity, A/HRC/23/34, 2013.

European Union publications:

- Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 13
- Guidance on ensuring the respect for the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union when implementing the European Structural and Investment Funds ('ESI Funds'), 2016/C 269/01 (O.J. C 269, 2016), which requires artistic freedom as an assessment criterion for investment funds.
- Exploring the connections between arts and human rights – Report of high-level expert meeting, Vienna, 29 – 30 May 2017, European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights
- European Parliament Resolution of 20 October 2021 on the situation of artists and the cultural recovery in the EU (2020/2261(INI)), Section 29
- See the Court of Justice of the European Union's limited jurisprudence on artistic freedom:
 - *Art & Allposters International BV v. Stichting Pictoright*, 2014, C-419/13
 - *Johan Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds VZW v. Helena Vandersteen et al.*, 2014, C-201/13
 - *Pelham GmbH et al. v. Ralf Hütter and Florian Schneider-Esleben*, 2019, C-476/17

Other sources:

- E. Polymenopoulou, *Does One Swallow Make a Spring? Artistic and Literary Freedom at the European Court of Human Rights*, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 2016/3.

KEY CASE-LAW REFERENCES

Leading Cases:

- *Müller and Others v. Switzerland*, 24 May 1988, Series A no. 133 (no violation of Article 10);
- *Karataş v. Turkey* [GC], no. 23168/94, § 48, ECHR 1999-IV (violation of Article 10);
- *Vereinigung Bildender Künstler and Others v. Austria*, no. 68354/01, 25 January 2007 (violation of Article 10);
- *Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France* [GC], nos. 21279/02 and 36448/02, 2 October 2007 (no violation of Article 10);
- *Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain* [GC], nos. 28955/06 and 3 others, 12 September 2011 (no violation of Article 10 read in the light of Article 11);
- *Bouton v. France*, no. 22636/19, 13 October 2022 (violation of Article 10);
- *Macatė v. Lithuania* [GC], no. 61435/19, 23 January 2023 (violation of Article 10);

Cases Under Article 10:

- *S. and G. v. the United Kingdom* (Commission decision), no. 17634/91, 2 September 1991 (inadmissible – manifestly ill-founded);
- *Wingrove v. the United Kingdom*, no. 17419/90, 25 November 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-V (no violation of Article 10);
- *Erkanlı v. Turkey*, no. 37721/97, 13 February 2003 (struck out of the list, friendly settlement);
- *Alinak v. Turkey*, no. 40287/98, 29 March 2005 (violation of Article 10);
- *İ.A. v. Turkey*, no. 42571/98, 13 September 2005 (no violation of Article 10);
- *Perrin v. the United Kingdom* (dec.), no. 5446/03, 18 October 2005 (inadmissible – manifestly ill-founded);
- *Ben el Mahi and Others v. Denmark* (dec.), no. 5853/06, 11 December 2006 (inadmissible – no jurisdiction);
- *Nikowitz and Verlagsgruppe News GmbH v. Austria*, no. 5266/03, 22 February 2007 (violation of Article 10);
- *Kar and Others v. Turkey*, no. 58756/00, 3 May 2007 (violation of Article 10);
- *Ulusoy and Others v. Turkey*, no. 34797/03, 3 May 2007 (violation of Article 10);
- *Leroy v. France*, no. 36109/03, 2 October 2008 (no violation of Article 10);
- *Alves da Silva v. Portugal*, no. 41665/07, 20 October 2009 (violation of Article 10);
- *Akdaş v. Turkey*, no. 41056/04, 16 February 2010 (violation of Article 10);
- *Ehrmann and SCI VHI v. France* (dec.), no. 2777/10, 7 June 2011 (inadmissible – manifestly ill-founded);
- *Tatár and Fáber v. Hungary*, nos. 26005/08 and 26160/08, 12 June 2012 (violation of Article 10)
- *Eon v. France*, no. 26118/10, 14 March 2013 (violation of Article 10);
- *Welsh and Silva Canha v. Portugal*, no. 16812/11, 17 September 2013 (violation of Article 10);
- *Murat Vural v. Turkey*, no. 9540/07, 21 October 2014 (violation of Article 10);
- *Almeida Leitão Bento Fernandes v. Portugal*, no. 25790/11, 12 March 2015 (no violation of Article 10);

- *M'Bala M'Bala v. France* (dec.), no. 25239/13, 20 October 2015 (inadmissible – incompatible *ratione materiae*);
- *Instytut Ekonomichnykh Reform, TOV v. Ukraine*, no. 61561/08, 2 June 2016 (violation of Article 10);
- *Ziemiński v. Poland (no. 2)*, no. 1799/07, 5 July 2016 (violation of Article 10);
- *Kaos GL v. Turkey*, no. 4982/07, 22 November 2016 (violation of Article 10);
- *Sekmadienis Ltd. v. Lithuania*, no. 69317/14, 30 January 2018 (violation of Article 10);
- *Sinkova v. Ukraine*, no. 39496/11, 27 February 2018 (no violation of Article 10);
- *Mariya Alekhina and Others v. Russia*, no. 38004/12, 17 July 2018 (violation of Article 10);
- *Mătășaru v. the Republic of Moldova*, nos. 69714/16 and 71685/16, 15 January 2019 (violation of Article 10);
- *Pryanishnikov v. Russia*, no. 25047/05, 10 September 2019 (violation of Article 10);
- *Peradze and Others v. Georgia*, no. 5631/16, 15 December 2022 (violation of Article 11 read in the light of Article 10);
- *C8 (Canal 8) v. France*, nos. 58951/18 and 1308/19, 9 February 2023 (no violation of Article 10);
- *Verzilov and Others v. Russia*, no. 25276/15, 29 August 2023 (violation of Article 10);
- *Kirkorov v. Lithuania* (dec.), no. 12174/22, 19 March 2024 (inadmissible – manifestly ill-founded);
- *Alexandru Pătrașcu v. Romania*, no. 1847/21, 7 January 2025 (violation of Article 10).

Cases Under Other Articles:

- *Choudhury v. the United Kingdom* (Commission decision), no. 17439/90, 5 March 1991 (Article 9; inadmissible – incompatible *ratione materiae*);
- *Beyeler v. Italy* [GC], no. 33202/96, ECHR 2000-I (violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1);
- *Ben el Mahi and Others v. Denmark* (dec.), no. 5853/06, 11 December 2006 (inadmissible – incompatible *ratione loci*);
- *Jelševar and Others v. Slovenia* (dec.), no. 47318/07, 11 March 2014 (Article 8; inadmissible – manifestly ill-founded);
- *Bohlen v. Germany*, no. 53495/09, 19 February 2015 (no violation of Article 8);
- *Ernst August von Hannover v. Germany*, no. 53649/09, 19 February 2015 (no violation of Article 8);
- *Sousa Goucha v. Portugal*, no. 70434/12, 22 March 2016 (no violation of Article 8).