



EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
COUR EUROPÉENNE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME

Guide on Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights

Derogation in time of emergency

Updated on 31 August 2026

Prepared by the Registry. It does not bind the Court.

Publishers or organisations wishing to translate and/or reproduce all or part of this report in the form of a printed or electronic publication are invited to complete the contact form: [request to reproduce or republish a translation](#) for information on the authorisation procedure.

If you wish to know which translations of the Case-Law Guides are currently under way, please see the list of [pending translations](#).

This Guide was originally drafted in English. It is updated regularly, most recently on 31 August 2026. It may be subject to editorial revision.

The Case-Law Guides are available for downloading at <https://ks.echr.coe.int>. For publication updates please follow the Court's X account at https://x.com/ECHR_CEDH.

© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights, 2026

Table of contents

Note to readers.....	4
I. General principles	5
II. Article 15 § 1: when a State may validly derogate	6
A. “...war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation...”	6
B. “...measures ... strictly required by the exigencies of the situation...”	8
C. “...provided that such measures are not inconsistent with [the High Contracting Party’s] other obligations under international law”	12
III. Article 15 § 2: non-derogable rights.....	13
IV. Article 15 § 3: the notification requirements	14
List of cited cases	16

Note to readers

This Guide is part of the series of Case-Law Guides published by the European Court of Human Rights (hereafter “the Court”, “the European Court” or “the Strasbourg Court”) to inform legal practitioners about the fundamental judgments and decisions delivered by the Strasbourg Court. This particular Guide analyses and sums up the case-law on Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights (hereafter “the Convention” or “the European Convention”). Readers will find herein the key principles in this area and the relevant precedents.

The case-law cited has been selected among the leading, major, and/or recent judgments and decisions*.

The Court’s judgments and decisions serve not only to decide those cases brought before it but, more generally, to elucidate, safeguard and develop the rules instituted by the Convention, thereby contributing to the observance by the States of the engagements undertaken by them as Contracting Parties (*Ireland v. the United Kingdom*, 1978, § 154, 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25, and, more recently, *Jerónovičs v. Latvia* [GC], 2016, § 109).

The mission of the system set up by the Convention is thus to determine issues of public policy in the general interest, thereby raising the standards of protection of human rights and extending human rights jurisprudence throughout the community of the Convention States (*Konstantin Markin v. Russia* [GC], § 89, no. 30078/06, ECHR 2012). Indeed, the Court has emphasised the Convention’s role as a “constitutional instrument of European public order” in the field of human rights (*Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland* [GC], no. 45036/98, § 156, ECHR 2005-VI, and more recently, *N.D. and N.T. v. Spain* [GC], nos. 8675/15 and 8697/15, § 110, 13 February 2020).

Protocol No. 15 to the Convention recently inserted the principle of subsidiarity into the Preamble to the Convention. This principle “imposes a shared responsibility between the States Parties and the Court” as regards human rights protection, and the national authorities and courts must interpret and apply domestic law in a manner that gives full effect to the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto (*Grzęda v. Poland* [GC], § 324).

This Guide contains references to keywords for each cited Article of the Convention and its Additional Protocols. The legal issues dealt with in each case are summarised in a [List of keywords](#), chosen from a thesaurus of terms taken (in most cases) directly from the text of the Convention and its Protocols.

The [HUDOC database](#) of the Court’s case-law enables searches to be made by keyword. Searching with these keywords enables a group of documents with similar legal content to be found (the Court’s reasoning and conclusions in each case are summarised through the keywords). Keywords for individual cases can be found by clicking on the Case Details tag in HUDOC. For further information about the HUDOC database and the keywords, please see the [HUDOC user manual](#).

* The case-law cited may be in either or both of the official languages (English and French) of the Court and the European Commission of Human Rights. Unless otherwise indicated, all references are to a judgment on the merits delivered by a Chamber of the Court. The abbreviation “(dec.)” indicates that the citation is of a decision of the Court and “[GC]” that the case was heard by the Grand Chamber. Chamber judgments that were not final when this update was published are marked with an asterisk (*).

I. General principles

Article 15 of the Convention – Derogation in time of emergency

“1. In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under [the] Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law.

2. No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (§ 1) and 7 shall be made under this provision.

3. Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of derogation shall keep the Secretary General of the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures which it has taken and the reasons therefore. It shall also inform the Secretary General of the Council of Europe when such measures have ceased to operate and the provisions of the Convention are again being fully executed.”

HUDOC keywords

War (15-1) – Public emergency (15-1) – Threat to the life of the nation (15-1) – Derogation (15-1) – Extent strictly required by situation (15-1) – International obligations (15-1) – Notification of a derogation (15-3)

1. Article 15 is a derogation clause. It affords to Contracting States, in exceptional circumstances, the possibility of derogating, in a limited and supervised manner, from their obligations to secure certain rights and freedoms under the Convention.

2. The text of Article 15 is based on the draft Article 4 of the United Nations draft Covenant on Human Rights, which later became Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).¹

3. Article 15 has three parts. Article 15 § 1 defines the circumstances in which Contracting States can validly derogate from their obligations under the Convention. It also limits the measures they may take in the course of any derogation. Article 15 § 2 protects certain fundamental rights in the Convention from any derogation. Article 15 § 3 sets out the procedural requirements that any State making a derogation must follow.

4. The making of a derogation need not be a concession that the State will not be able to guarantee the rights contained in the Convention. Indeed, the practice when lodging a derogation has been for the Contracting State to state that the measures it is taking “may” involve a derogation from the Convention. For this reason, in any case where an applicant complains that his or her Convention rights were violated during a period of derogation, the Court will first examine whether the measures taken can be justified under the substantive Articles of the Convention; it is only if it cannot be so justified that the Court will go on to determine whether the derogation was valid (see, for instance, *A. and Others v. the United Kingdom* [GC], 2009, § 161; *Ireland v. the United Kingdom*, 1978, § 191; *Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3)*, 1961, § 15).

5. Thus, in *Terheş v. Romania* (dec.), 2021, § 46 – concerning a general lockdown imposed on the population in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, in the context of which the respondent State had availed itself of the possibility of derogating from Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 – the Court did not need

1. See p. 10 of, and Appendix I to, the *Travaux préparatoires* on Article 15 (document DH (56) 4 available on the Court’s Library website at www.echr.coe.int/Library). The American Convention on Human Rights also contains a derogation clause (Article 27). There is no such clause in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.

to examine the situation from the standpoint of Article 15 since the applicant's complaints had been raised solely under Article 5 § 1, which was declared inapplicable *ratione materiae*.

6. On one occasion when a derogation had been made, the Court declined to assess whether the situation complained of was covered by a valid derogation on the ground that the parties to the proceedings before it had not so requested (*Khlebik v. Ukraine*, 2017, § 82).

II. Article 15 § 1: when a State may validly derogate

Article 15 § 1 of the Convention

"1. In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under [the] Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law."

HUDOC keywords

War (15-1) – Public emergency (15-1) – Threat to the life of the nation (15-1) – Derogation (15-1) – Extent strictly required by situation (15-1) – International obligations (15-1)

7. Article 15 § 1 sets out three conditions for a valid derogation:

- it must be in time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation;
- the measures taken in response to that war or public emergency must not go beyond the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation; and
- the measures must not be inconsistent with the State's other obligations under international law.

A. "...war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation..."

8. The Court has not been required to interpret the meaning of "war" in Article 15 § 1; in any case, any substantial violence or unrest short of war is likely to fall within the scope of the second limb of Article 15 § 1, a "public emergency threatening the life of the nation".

9. The natural and customary meaning of "public emergency threatening the life of the nation" is clear and refers to "an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which affects the whole population and constitutes a threat to the organised life of the community of which the State is composed" (*Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3)*, 1961, § 28).

10. The emergency should be actual or imminent; a crisis which concerns only a particular region of the State can amount to a public emergency threatening "the life of the nation" (see, for instance, derogations in respect of Northern Ireland in *Ireland v. the United Kingdom*, 1978, § 205, and in respect of South-East Turkey in *Aksoy v. Turkey*, 1996, § 70); and the crisis or danger should be exceptional in that the normal measures or restrictions permitted by the Convention for the maintenance of public safety, health and order are plainly inadequate (*Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands v. Greece* (the "*Greek case*"), Commission report, 1969, § 153).

11. The Court's case-law has never, to date, explicitly incorporated the requirement that the emergency be temporary and, indeed, the cases demonstrate that it is possible for a "public emergency" within the meaning of Article 15 to continue for many years (see the security situation in

Northern Ireland: *Ireland v. the United Kingdom*, 1978, *Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom*, 1993, *Marshall v. the United Kingdom* (dec.), 2001; and the security situation in place in the aftermath of the al-Qaeda attacks in the United States: *A. and Others v. the United Kingdom* [GC], 2009, § 178).

12. Generally the Convention organs have deferred to the national authorities' assessment as to whether such an exceptional situation exists. As the Court stated in *Ireland v. the United Kingdom*, 1978, § 207: "it falls in the first place to each Contracting State, with its responsibility for 'the life of [its] nation', to determine whether that life is threatened by a 'public emergency'". By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the pressing needs of the moment, the national authorities are in principle better placed than the international judge to decide both on the presence of such an emergency and on the nature and scope of the derogations necessary to avert it. Accordingly, in this matter a wide margin of appreciation should be left to the national authorities. Nevertheless, the Court had emphasised that States do not enjoy an unlimited discretion in this respect. The domestic margin of appreciation is accompanied by European supervision (*Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom*, 1993, § 43; *Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey*, 2018, § 91; *Şahin Alpaz v. Turkey*, 2018, § 75; *Domenjoud v. France*, 2024, § 145).

13. The Court has held that terrorism in Northern Ireland met the standard of a public emergency, since for a number of years it represented a "particularly far-reaching and acute danger for the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom, the institutions of the six counties [of Northern Ireland] and the lives of the province's inhabitants" (*Ireland v. the United Kingdom*, 1978, §§ 205 and 212; *Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom*, 1993, § 48; *Marshall v. the United Kingdom* (dec.), 2001). So, too, did PKK terrorist activity in South-East Turkey (*Aksoy v. Turkey*, 1996, § 70), the imminent threat of serious terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom after 11 September 2001 (*A. and Others v. the United Kingdom* [GC], 2009, § 181), the several terrorist attacks in France between 2015 and 2017 (*Domenjoud v. France*, 2024, § 150), and the attempted military coup in Turkey in 2016 (*Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey*, 2018, §§ 91-93; *Şahin Alpaz v. Turkey*, 2018, §§ 75-77; this observation was repeated in, for example, *Kavala v. Turkey*, 2019, § 88; *Alparşlan Altan v. Turkey*, 2019, §§ 73-74; *Pişkin v. Turkey*, 2020, § 59; *Atilla Taş v. Turkey*, 2021, § 83; *Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye*, 2024, § 90). The requirement of imminence is not, however, to be interpreted so narrowly as to require a State to wait for disaster to strike before taking measures to deal with it (*A. and Others v. the United Kingdom* [GC], 2009, § 177).

14. Notwithstanding this general approach of deference towards the national authorities' assessment, it is not unlimited. For instance, in the "*Greek case*" (Commission report, §§ 159-165 and 207) – following the "colonels" coup in 1967 – the Commission found that, on the evidence before it, there was no public emergency which justified the derogation made. It should be noted that the existence of a "public emergency" was not disputed in the above-noted cases concerning the situation in Northern Ireland and south-east Turkey, whereas this was clearly disputed in some detail in the "*Greek case*" as regards the attempted derogation by the military government in Greece.

15. Similarly, with regard to the state of emergency declared in Yerevan in the context of post-election demonstrations, the Court found that, despite their scale and the violence they might have entailed, the respondent Government had not shown that the demonstrations, which enjoyed protection under Article 11, could be regarded as "threatening the life of the nation". As a result, the Court did not find it necessary to consider the other requirements of Article 15 § 1 – in other words, to determine whether the measures taken in the case had been strictly required by the exigencies of the situation and had been consistent with the other obligations under international law – since that finding was sufficient for it to conclude that the derogation had not satisfied the requirements of Article 15 (*Dareskizb Ltd v. Armenia*, 2021, §§ 62-63).

16. Since the purpose of Article 15 is to permit States to take derogating measures to protect their populations from future risks, the existence of the threat to the life of the nation must be assessed primarily with reference to those facts which were known at the time of the derogation. The Court is

not precluded, however, from having regard to information which comes to light subsequently (*A. and Others v. the United Kingdom* [GC], 2009, § 177).

17. However, if measures are taken outside the territory to which the derogation applies, the derogation will not apply and the Government concerned will not be able to rely on it to justify the measures (*Sakık and Others v. Turkey*, 1997, § 39; for a similar finding, see *Sadak v. Turkey*, 2004, §§ 56; *Yurttaş v. Turkey*, 2004, § 58; *Abdülşamet Yaman v. Turkey*, 2004, § 69; and more recently, *Barseghyan v. Armenia*, 2021, § 36).

18. Although there have been a number of cases of Contracting States taking part in military missions outside their own territory since their ratification of the Convention, until today no State has ever made a derogation pursuant to Article 15 of the Convention in respect of these activities (*Hassan v. the United Kingdom* [GC], 2014, § 101; and – repeating this observation – *Georgia v. Russia (II)* [GC], 2021, § 139).

19. This practice of not derogating in the event of international armed conflicts outside their own territory can be interpreted as the High Contracting Parties considering that in such situations, they do not exercise their “jurisdiction” within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention (*Georgia v. Russia (II)* [GC], 2021, same paragraph). However, the Court has accepted the respondent State’s lack of jurisdiction over the events in issue only in respect of the active phase of hostilities (*ibid.*, §§ 125-144 ; compare *Hassan v. the United Kingdom* [GC], 2014, §§ 74-80, regarding jurisdiction based on State agent authority and control over the person concerned). As regards the phase after the cessation of hostilities, the Court has held that the facts fell within the jurisdiction of the respondent State on account of the effective control it exercised over the occupied territory (*Georgia v. Russia (II)* [GC], 2021, §§ 162-175)².

B. “...measures ... strictly required by the exigencies of the situation...”

20. The Court has said that the limits on its powers of review are “particularly apparent” where Article 15 is concerned (*Ireland v. the United Kingdom*, 1978, § 207):

“It falls in the first place to each Contracting State, with its responsibility for ‘the life of [its] nation’, to determine whether that life is threatened by a ‘public emergency’ and, if so, how far it is necessary to go in attempting to overcome the emergency. By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the pressing needs of the moment, the national authorities are in principle in a better position than the international judge to decide both on the presence of such an emergency and on the nature and scope of derogations necessary to avert it. In this matter Article 15 § 1 (...) leaves those authorities a wide margin of appreciation.”

21. Nevertheless, the States do not enjoy an unlimited power in this respect: the Court is empowered to rule on whether the States have gone beyond the “extent strictly required by the exigencies” of the crisis (*Ireland v. the United Kingdom*; *Domenjoud v. France*, 2024, § 144). To assess whether the measures taken were “strictly required by the exigencies of the situation and consistent with the other obligations under international law”, the Court examines the complaints on the merits (*Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey*, 2018, § 94; *Şahin Alpay v. Turkey*, 2018, § 78; *Kavala v. Turkey*, 2019, § 88; *Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye*, 2024, § 90).

22. As the Court has clarified, the existence of a “public emergency threatening the life of the nation” must not serve as a pretext for limiting freedom of political debate. Even in a state of emergency the States must bear in mind that any measures taken should seek to protect the democratic order from the threats to it, and every effort should be made to safeguard the values of a democratic society,

² See [Guide on Article 1 of the Convention](#).

such as pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness (*Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey*, 2018, § 210; *Şahin Alpay v. Turkey*, 2018, § 180).

23. In determining whether a State has gone beyond what is strictly required, the Court will give appropriate weight to factors such as the nature of the rights affected by the derogation, the circumstances leading to, and the duration of, the emergency situation (*Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom*, 1993, § 43; *A. and Others v. the United Kingdom* [GC], 2009, § 173).

24. This involves the Court considering matters such as:

- whether ordinary laws would have been sufficient to meet the danger caused by the public emergency (*Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3)*, 1961, § 36; *Ireland v. the United Kingdom*, 1978, § 212);
- whether the measures are a genuine response to an emergency situation (*Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom*, 1993, § 51; *Alparslan Altan v. Turkey*, 2019, § 118);
- whether the measures were used for the purpose for which they were granted (*Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3)*, 1961, § 38; *Domenjoud v. France*, 2024, § 154);
- whether the Government are able to show that there is a sufficient connection between the individual case and the derogation relied on (*Domenjoud v. France*, 2024, § 154; see also, implicitly, *Vedat Şorli v. Turkey*, 2021, § 46 – concerning an insult to the head of State);
- whether the derogation is limited in scope and the reasons advanced in support of it (*Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom*, 1993, § 66);
- whether the need for the derogation was kept under review (*ibid.*, § 54);
- any attenuation in the measures imposed (*Ireland v. the United Kingdom*, 1978, § 220);
- whether the measures were subject to safeguards (*ibid.*, §§ 216-219; *Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3)*, 1961, § 37; *Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom*, 1993, §§ 61-65; *Aksoy v. Turkey*, 1996, §§ 79-84);
- the importance of the right at stake, and the broader purpose of judicial control over interferences with that right (*ibid.*, § 76);
- whether judicial control of the measures was practicable (*ibid.*, § 78;³ *Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom*, 1993, § 59);
- the proportionality of the measures and whether they involved any unjustifiable discrimination (*A. and Others v. the United Kingdom* [GC], 2009, § 190); whether they were “lawful” and were effected “in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law” (*Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey*, 2018, §§ 140 and 213; *Şahin Alpay v. Turkey*, 2018, §§ 119 and 183);
- whether legal certainty is not compromised by a judicial interpretation running counter to the applicable statutory provisions (*Baş v. Turkey*, 2020, §§ 151-153). Thus, for example, the Court has found that an interpretation of the legal concept of “*in flagrante delicto*” – allowing judges to be detained without the prior lifting of their immunity, a guarantee of their independence – that expanded the scope of that concept “so that judges suspected of belonging to a criminal association are deprived of the judicial protection afforded by Turkish law to members of the judiciary” was such as to “[negate] the procedural safeguards which members of the judiciary are afforded in order to protect them from interference by the executive” (*ibid.*);
- whether the minimum requirements of Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention regarding the “reasonableness” of a suspicion justifying an individual’s detention are satisfied (*Alparslan*

3. See also the post-*Aksoy* cases: *Demir and Others v. Turkey*, 1998, §§ 49-58; *Nuray Şen v. Turkey*, 2003, §§ 25-29; *Elçi and Others v. Turkey*, 2003, § 684; *Bilen v. Turkey*, 2006, §§ 44-50.

Altan v. Turkey, 2019, §§ 147-149; *Kavala v. Turkey*, 2019, §§ 176-196; *Baş v. Turkey*, 2020, § 200);

- whether the court decided “speedily” on the lawfulness of detention within the meaning of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention (*Baş v. Turkey*, 2020, §§ 216 and 230), including the Constitutional Court (*Kavala v. Turkey*, 2019, §§ 176-196); and
- the views of any national courts which have considered the question (*Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey*, 2018, §§ 93 and 140; *Şahin Alpay v. Turkey*, 2018, §§ 77 and 119; *Alparslan Altan v. Turkey*, 2019, § 146). If the highest domestic court in a Contracting State has reached the conclusion that the measures were not strictly required, the Court will be justified in reaching a contrary conclusion only if satisfied that the national court had misinterpreted or misapplied Article 15 or the Court’s jurisprudence under that Article, or reached a conclusion which was manifestly unreasonable (*A. and Others v. the United Kingdom* [GC], 2009, § 174).

25. These factors will normally be assessed, not retrospectively, but on the basis of the “conditions and circumstances reigning when [the measures] were originally taken and subsequently applied” (*Ireland v. the United Kingdom*, 1978, § 214). However, it may be that, as with the assessment of whether there is a public emergency, the Court is not precluded from having regard to information which comes to light subsequently (*A. and Others v. the United Kingdom* [GC], 2009, § 177, where the Court took note of the bombings and attempted bombings in London in July 2005, which took place therefore years after the notification of the derogation in 2001).

26. To be deemed “strictly required by the situation” within the meaning of Article 15 § 1, the measure must be covered by the derogation notified by the State. The case of *Domenjoud v. France*, 2024 concerned a preventive home-curfew order issued under state-of-emergency legislation in view of a potential participation in violent actions during the COP21 summit. The Court assessed whether the derogating measures had been strictly required in the light of the reasons for the derogation. In the information transmitted to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe pursuant to Article 15 § 3, the Government had indicated that the state of emergency had been declared “to prevent the commission of further terrorist attacks” (§ 154). The Court found that, in the absence of any individual and detailed assessment of the second applicant’s behaviour or actions, the Government had not convincingly shown that his placement under home curfew had been ordered with the aim of combatting terrorism. Therefore, the measure in issue had not been strictly necessary to fulfil the aim pursued by the exercise of the right of derogation (§ 155).

27. The considerations giving rise to the application of Article 15 gradually become less forceful and relevant as the public emergency threatening the life of the nation, while still persisting, declines in intensity. The exigency criterion must therefore be applied more stringently (*Baş v. Turkey*, 2020, § 224). The Court does accept that when a State is struggling against a public emergency threatening the life of the nation, it would be rendered defenceless if it were required to accomplish everything at once, to furnish from the outset each of its chosen means of action with each of the safeguards reconcilable with the priority requirements for the proper functioning of the authorities and for restoring peace within the community. The interpretation of Article 15 of the Convention must leave a place for progressive adaptations (*ibid.*, § 229). Nevertheless, in the case of an interference with a fundamental Convention right, given the potentially adverse impact it entails, the Court will examine whether the interference is still strictly required for the preservation of public safety (*ibid.*, § 230).

28. In a number of cases where the applicants’ pre-trial detention had been ordered on the basis of a statutory provision that had remained unchanged before and after the declaration of the state of emergency – a provision requiring the presence of factual evidence giving rise to strong suspicion as to the commission of an offence – the Court held that the applicants’ detention, without any factual evidence grounding the suspicions raised by the authorities, could not be said to have observed the limits laid down in Article 15 of the Convention since, ultimately, no derogating measure had been applicable; to conclude otherwise would negate the minimum requirements of Article 5 § 1 (c) of the

Convention (*Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey*, 2020, § 183; *Kavala v. Turkey*, 2019, § 158; see also *Akgün v. Turkey*, 2021, § 184; *Murat Aksoy v. Turkey*, 2021, § 111; *Atilla Taş v. Turkey*, 2021, § 140).

29. Under Article 5 § 4, the Court has examined restrictions on access to a criminal investigation file potentially affecting those held in pre-trial detention during the state of emergency. In *Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey*, 2021, the decision to restrict access to the investigation file was based on a Legislative Decree which had entered into force during the state of emergency and had thus constituted a derogating measure. However, the Court observed, firstly, that the restriction had been based on a general order by the Istanbul public prosecutor concerning the criminal investigation in respect of suspected FETÖ/PDY members, which had been issued prior to the applicant's arrest; and secondly, that the restriction had been lifted after the filing of the indictment, while the state of emergency was still in force. Accordingly, this restrictive general order could not be regarded as an appropriate response to the state of emergency; an interpretation to the contrary would negate the safeguards provided for in Article 5 of the Convention (§ 165).

30. In *Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye*, 2024, a judge serving at the United Nations International Residual Mechanisms for Criminal Tribunals had, despite his diplomatic immunity, been arrested and detained pending his trial. The Court found that the measure could not be regarded as strictly required by the exigencies of the attempted coup d'état of 15 July 2016 which gave rise to the state of emergency. In particular, the Court was not convinced that the domestic courts' failure to assess the applicant's diplomatic immunity, up until the trial court pronounced itself on the merits of the case and convicted the applicant, could be regarded as strictly required by the exigencies of the attempted coup d'état of 15 July 2016 which gave rise to the state of emergency (§ 130).

31. Referring to *Al-Dulimi and Montana Management Inc. v. Switzerland* [GC], 2016, § 146 – concerning a sanctions regime set up by the United Nations Security Council – the Court held that where an emergency legislative decree did not contain clear and explicit wording excluding the possibility of judicial supervision of the measures taken for its implementation, it should always be understood as authorising the courts of the respondent State to exercise sufficient scrutiny so that any arbitrariness could be avoided (*Pişkin v. Turkey*, 2020, § 153). Even in a state of emergency, it would not be consistent with the rule of law in a democratic society if a State could, without restraint or control by the Court, remove from the jurisdiction of the courts a whole range of civil claims or confer immunity from civil liability on certain categories of persons (*ibid.*; referring, mutatis mutandis, to *Fayed v. the United Kingdom*, 1994, § 65). In *Pişkin v. Turkey*, 2020, the Court was prepared to accept that the introduction of a simplified procedure for the immediate dismissal of civil servants or other civil-service employees who had clearly been involved in the attempted military coup of 15 July 2016 could be justified in the light of the very specific circumstances of the state of emergency (§ 125, where the Court referred to the opinion of the Venice Commission on the legislative decrees adopted in that context). However, although the legislative decree introducing the simplified procedure had placed no limitations on the judicial review to be conducted by the domestic courts as to the factual and legal grounds justifying such dismissals, the reasoning of the judgments delivered in the applicant's case – with no indication of any in-depth, thorough examination of his arguments – suggested that they themselves had declined to exercise their full jurisdiction in that regard (§§ 150-152). In those circumstances, the Court found that the notice of derogation by Turkey under Article 15 of the Convention could not justify the failure to observe the requirements of a fair trial (*ibid.*, § 153).

C. “...provided that such measures are not inconsistent with [the High Contracting Party’s] other obligations under international law”

32. The Court will consider this limb of Article 15 § 1 of its own motion if necessary (*Lawless v. Ireland* (no. 3), 1961, § 40), even if only to observe that it has not found any inconsistency between the derogation and a State’s other obligations under international law.

33. In *Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom*, 1993, the Court considered the applicants’ submission that official proclamation was a requirement for a valid derogation under Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights⁴ and the absence of such proclamation meant the United Kingdom’s derogation was not consistent with its obligations under international law. The Court rejected that submission. It found that it was not its role to seek to define authoritatively the meaning of the terms “officially proclaimed” in Article 4 of the ICCPR. Nevertheless, it had to examine whether there was any plausible basis for the applicants’ submission. It found that the Home Secretary’s statement to the House of Commons on the derogation was “well in keeping with the notion of an official proclamation” (§§ 67-73).⁵

34. In *Marshall v. the United Kingdom* (dec.), 2001, the applicant relied on the observation of the United Nations Human Rights Committee that the emergency provisions in Northern Ireland were “excessive” and that withdrawal of the derogation made under Article 4 of the ICCPR should be envisaged. The Court stated that it found nothing in these references to suggest that the Government must be considered in breach of their obligations under the ICCPR by maintaining their derogation after 1995. On that account, the applicant could not maintain that the continuance in force of the derogation was incompatible with the authorities’ obligations under international law.

35. In *Hassan v. the United Kingdom* [GC], 2014, the Court had to decide whether, in the absence of a derogation in an international conflict context, the Court could nevertheless re-interpret a Convention provision in accordance with the principles of international (humanitarian) law. The Court replied in the affirmative, accepting that, although internment was not a permitted ground for the deprivation of liberty under the text of Article 5, the Contracting Party was not required to derogate from its obligations under Article 5 in order to allow for the internment of prisoners of war and civilians posing a threat to security in a conflict context because that Article could be interpreted and applied in accordance with the principles of international humanitarian law (namely the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions).

36. In *Georgia v. Russia (II)* [GC], 2021, which likewise concerned an international armed conflict without a derogation from the Convention, the Court clarified its methodology (§ 95): for each aspect of the case and each Convention Article alleged to have been breached, it ascertained whether there was a conflict between the two legal regimes formed by the provisions of the Convention and the rules of international humanitarian law (IHL). The Court thus compared the requirements of IHL with those:

- of Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, regarding civilians who had been killed or ill-treated or whose homes had been set on fire or looted (§§ 194-199);

4. Article 4 § 1 of the ICCPR providing, in relevant part: “In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed...”.

5. Cf. the Commission’s conclusion in the case of *Cyprus v. Turkey* (Commission report of 10 July 1976, § 527): “Article 15 requires some formal and public act of derogation, such as a declaration of martial law or state of emergency, and that, where no such act has been proclaimed by the High Contracting Party concerned, although it was not in the circumstances prevented from doing so, Article 15 cannot apply.”

- of Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention, regarding the treatment and detention of civilians (§§ 234-237);
- of Article 3 of the Convention, regarding the treatment of prisoners of war (§§ 266-267);
- of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4, regarding the freedom of movement of displaced persons (§§ 290-291);
- of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1, regarding the alleged looting or destruction of public schools and libraries (§§ 310-311);
- of Article 2 of the Convention, regarding the obligation to investigate (§§ 323-325).

37. In *Aydın Sefer Akay v. Türkiye*, 2024, the Court extended the caveat of “other obligations under international law”, within the meaning of Article 15, to obligations arising from diplomatic immunity, in the context of an international judge’s pre-trial detention (§ 130) and searches of his residence and person (§ 144), which could not be justified under this provision.

III. Article 15 § 2: non-derogable rights

Article 15 § 2 of the Convention

“2. No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (§ 1) and 7 shall be made under this provision.”

38. Article 15 § 2 protects certain rights from derogation. According to the text of Article 15 § 2, these are: Article 2 (the right to life), except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war; Article 3 (the prohibition of torture and other forms of ill-treatment); Article 4 § 1 (the prohibition of slavery or servitude); and Article 7 (no punishment without law).

39. Three of the additional protocols to the Convention also contain clauses which prohibit derogation from certain of the rights contained in them. These are Protocol No. 6 (the abolition of the death penalty in time of peace and limiting the death penalty in time of war), Protocol No. 7 (the *ne bis in idem* principle only, as contained in Article 4 of that protocol) and Protocol No. 13 (the complete abolition of the death penalty).⁶

40. The effect of Article 15 § 2 (and the corresponding non-derogation clauses in Protocol Nos. 6, 7 and 13) is that the rights to which they refer continue to apply during any time of war or public emergency, irrespective of any derogation made by a Contracting State.

41. In respect of Articles 2 and 7 of the Convention, the exceptions already contained in those rights will also continue to apply.

42. Thus as regards Article 2, any deprivation of life will not be in contravention of the Article if it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary in the circumstances set out in Article 2 § 2 (a)-(c) (the defence of any person from unlawful violence, to effect a lawful arrest or prevent escape of a person lawfully detained, action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection). Article 15 § 2 adds the additional exception that the right to life will not be violated if the death results from a lawful act of war.

43. Equally, as regards Article 7, the prohibition on no punishment without law is subject to the provisions of Article 7 § 2, namely that the Article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any

6. Article 3 of Protocol No. 6, Article 4 § 3 of Protocol No. 7, and Article 2 of Protocol No. 13.

person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognised by civilized nations.

IV. Article 15 § 3: the notification requirements

Article 15 § 3 of the Convention

“3. Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of derogation shall keep the Secretary General of the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures which it has taken and the reasons therefore. It shall also inform the Secretary General of the Council of Europe when such measures have ceased to operate and the provisions of the Convention are again being fully executed.”

HUDOC keywords

Notification of a derogation (15-3)

44. The primary purpose of informing the Secretary General is that the derogation becomes public. A further purpose is that the Convention is a system of collective enforcement and it is through the Secretary General that the other Contracting States are informed of the derogation: by Resolution 56 (16) of the Committee of Ministers, any information transmitted to the Secretary General in pursuance of Article 15 § 3 must be communicated by him as soon as possible to the other Contracting States (*Greece v. the United Kingdom*, 1958, § 158).

45. In the absence of an official and public notice of derogation, Article 15 does not apply to the measures taken by the respondent State (*Cyprus v. Turkey*, Commission report of 4 October 1983, §§ 66-68 and more recently, *Rainbow Mission Foundation and Others v. Hungary*, 2026, § 113).

46. The requirement to notify the Secretary General of the measures taken and the reasons therefor is usually met by writing a letter and attaching copies of the legal texts under which the emergency measures will be taken, with an explanation of their purpose (*Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3)*, 1961, § 47). If copies of all relevant measures are not provided, the requirement will not be met (the “*Greek case*”, Commission report, § 81(1) and (2)).

47. In the case of *Greece v. the United Kingdom*, 1958, the Commission found that it was clear from the wording of Article 15 § 3 that the notification did not need to be made before the measure in question had been introduced but also that the wording of this provision did not give guidance either as to the time within which the notification must be made or as to the extent of the information to be furnished to the Secretary General. The Commission considered that it was for the State concerned to notify the measures in question without any unavoidable delay together with sufficient information concerning them to enable the other High Contracting Parties to appreciate the nature and extent of the derogation which the measures involved. In that case, the three-month period between the taking of the derogating measure and its notification had been too long and could not be justified by administrative delays resulting from the alleged emergency. The same was true for the notification of certain measures four months after they were taken in the “*Greek case*” (Commission report, § 81(3)). In contrast, the Court has found that notification twelve days after the measures entered into force was sufficient (*Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3)*, 1961, § 47).

48. The Court has jurisdiction to examine of its own motion whether a notification by a State complies with the formal requirements provided in Article 15 § 3 – namely, keeping the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures taken by way of derogation from the Convention and the reasons for them – even if that issue has not been raised by any of the parties (*Aksoy v. Turkey*, 1996, §§ 85-86; *Domenjoud v. France*, 2024, §§ 147-148).

49. The Court has accepted that this formal condition was observed even where the notice of derogation did not explicitly mention which Articles of the Convention were concerned, in cases where the parties had not raised any objections in that regard (*Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey*, 2018, § 89; *Şahin Alpay v. Turkey*, 2018, § 73; *Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey*, 2021, §§ 100-102; *Domenjoud v. France*, 2024, § 151).

50. The Court may also raise of its own motion the question of the scope *ratione temporis* or *ratione materiae* of the derogation (*Alparslan Altan v. Turkey*, 2019, § 74).

51. The Court has also found that Article 15 § 3 implies a requirement of permanent review of the need for emergency measures (*Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom*, 1993, § 54).

52. Finally, when the derogation is withdrawn (in compliance with the last sentence of Article 15 § 3), in any case concerning measures taken after the withdrawal of the derogation, the Court will examine the case on the basis that the relevant Articles of the Convention in respect of which complaints have been made are fully applicable. This does not, however, preclude proper account being taken of the background circumstances of the case. It is for the Court to determine the significance to be attached to those circumstances and to ascertain whether the balance struck complied with the applicable provisions of the relevant article, in the light of their particular wording and the article's overall object and purpose (*Brogan and Others v. the United Kingdom*, 1988, § 48, in respect of Article 5).

List of cited cases

The case-law cited in this Guide refers to judgments or decisions delivered by the Court and to decisions or reports of the European Commission of Human Rights (“the Commission”).

Unless otherwise indicated, all references are to a judgment on the merits delivered by a Chamber of the Court. The abbreviation “(dec.)” indicates that the citation is of a decision of the Court and “[GC]” that the case was heard by the Grand Chamber.

Chamber judgments that were not final within the meaning of Article 44 of the Convention when this update was published are marked with an asterisk (*) in the list below. Article 44 § 2 of the Convention provides: “The judgment of a Chamber shall become final (a) when the parties declare that they will not request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber; or (b) three months after the date of the judgment, if reference of the case to the Grand Chamber has not been requested; or (c) when the panel of the Grand Chamber rejects the request to refer under Article 43”. In cases where a request for referral is accepted by the Grand Chamber panel, the Chamber judgment does not become final and thus has no legal effect; it is the subsequent Grand Chamber judgment that becomes final.

The hyperlinks to the cases cited in the electronic version of the Guide are directed to the HUDOC database (<http://hudoc.echr.coe.int>) which provides access to the case-law of the Court (Grand Chamber, Chamber and Committee judgments and decisions, communicated cases, advisory opinions and legal summaries from the Case-Law Information Note) and of the Commission (decisions and reports), and to the resolutions of the Committee of Ministers.

The Court delivers its judgments and decisions in English and/or French, its two official languages. HUDOC also contains translations of many important cases into more than thirty non-official languages, and links to around one hundred online case-law collections produced by third parties.

—A—

A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 3455/05, ECHR 2009
Abdülşamet Yaman v. Turkey, no. 32446/96, 2 November 2004
Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey, no. 13252/17, 13 April 2021
Akgün v. Turkey, no. 19699/18, 20 July 2021
Aksoy v. Turkey, 18 December 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI
Al-Dulimi and Montana Management Inc. v. Switzerland [GC], no. 5809/08, 21 June 2016
Alparslan Altan v. Turkey, no. 12778/17, 16 April 2019
Atilla Taş v. Turkey, no. 72/17, 19 January 2021
Aydın Sefa Akay v. Türkiye, no. 59/17, 23 April 2024

—B—

Barseghyan v. Armenia, no. 17804/09, 21 September 2021
Baş v. Turkey, no. 66448/17, 3 March 2020
Bilen v. Turkey, no. 34482/97, 21 February 2006
Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, 26 May 1993, Series A no. 258-B
Brogan and Others v. the United Kingdom, 29 November 1988, Series A no. 145-B

—C—

Cyprus v. Turkey, nos. 6780/74 and 6950/75, Commission report of 10 July 1976
Cyprus v. Turkey, no. 8007/77, Commission report of 6 October 1983

—D—

Dareskizb Ltd v. Armenia, no. 61737/08, 21 September 2021
Demir and Others v. Turkey, 23 September 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VI
Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands v. Greece (the “Greek case”), nos. 3321/67 and 3 others, Commission report of 5 November 1969, Yearbook 12
Domenjoud v. France, nos. 34749/16 and 79607/17, 16 May 2024

—E—

Elçi and Others v. Turkey, nos. 23145/93 and 25091/94, 13 November 2003

—F—

Fayed v. the United Kingdom, 21 September 1994, Series A no. 294-B

—G—

Georgia v. Russia (II) [GC], no. 38263/08, 21 January 2021
Greece v. the United Kingdom, no. 176/56, Commission report of 26 September 1958

—H—

Hassan v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 29750/09, ECHR 2014

—I—

Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25

—K—

Kavala v. Turkey, no. 28749/18, 10 December 2019
Khlebk v. Ukraine, no. 2945/16, 25 July 2017

—L—

Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3), 1 July 1961, Series A no. 3

—M—

Marshall v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 41571/98, 10 July 2001
Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, no. 13237/17, 20 March 2018
Murat Aksoy v. Turkey, no. 80/17, 13 April 2021

—N—

Nuray Şen v. Turkey, no. 41478/98, 17 June 2003

—O—

Pişkin v. Turkey, no. 33399/18, 15 December 2020

—R—

Rainbow Mission Foundation and Others v. Hungary, nos. 32272/21 and 4 others, 7 July 2026

—S—

Sabuncu and Others v. Turkey, no. 23199/17, 10 November 2020

Sadak v. Turkey, nos. 25142/94 and 27099/95, 8 April 2004

Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, no. 16538/17, 20 March 2018

Sakık and Others v. Turkey, 26 November 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VII

—T—

Terheş v. Romania (dec.), no. 49933/20, 13 April 2021

—V—

Vedat Şorli v. Turkey, no. 42048/19, 19 October 2021

—Y—

Yurttaş v. Turkey, nos. 25143/94 and 27098/95, 27 May 2004